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Abstract
Smart power grids offer to revolutionize power distribution by sharing granular power usage data, though this
same data sharing can reveal a great deal about users, and there are serious privacy concerns for customers. In this
paper, we address these concerns using differential privacy. Differential privacy is a statistical notion of privacy that
adds carefully-calibrated noise to sensitive data before sharing it, and we apply it to provide strong privacy guarantees
to individual customers. Under this implementation, we quantify the impact of privacy upon smart grid analytics,
which are of interest to utilities, to quantify the loss in accuracy incurred by privacy. Simultaneously, we quantify the
financial impact of privacy through bounding deviations in customers’ utility bills. Simulation results are provided
using actual power usage data, demonstrating the viability of this approach in practice.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the emergence of smart grid technologies has led to a great deal of research in power systems,
e.g., [1–3]. The basic idea underlying smart grids is that smarter sensing technologies can be applied to individual
buildings to give more granular power usage data over time. Although these technologies are promising, they
implicate significant privacy concerns among users. The power usage data gathered in smart grids can be aggregated
over time for individual users, and these datasets can be quite revealing.
Indeed, both the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS)
in the European Union have identified major privacy concerns in smart grids [4, 5]. Specifically, the EDPS has
reported that smart grid data can “provide a detailed breakdown of energy usage over a long period of time, which
can show patterns of use” and that “[p]rofiles can thus be developed and then applied back to individual households
and individual members of these households” [5, Page 15]. In addition, the DOE has noted that these usage patterns
“could reveal personal details about the lives of consumers, such as their daily schedules” [4, Page 2].
In this paper, we develop a method for preserving users’ privacy while still allowing smart grids to function
normally. This method sends privatized samples of customers’ demand data to the utility company, providing
privacy of data in transit and privacy from the utility itself. The goal in this privacy implementation is to enable
utility companies to perform in-house or third-party data analytics without revealing sensitive customer data.
Common existing approaches to privacy in smart grids include battery-based load hiding methods [6, 7], which
require hardware that not all homes have. Homomorphic encryption schemes have also been used [8, 9], though
these methods can be computationally demanding and may support a limited collection of mathematical operations,
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2which restricts analytics downstream. Developments in [10] provide information-theoretic privacy guarantees, though
that work requires power consumption and appliance use to satisfy certain modeling assumptions, which may not
always hold. In contrast, this work requires no such assumptions.
Our privacy implementation is built on the framework of differential privacy, which is a statistical notion of privacy
that originates in the database literature [11]. Differential privacy adds carefully-calibrated noise to sensitive data
before sharing it, and it provides strong, rigorous privacy guarantees in several forms. First, it is immune to post-
processing, in that transforming differentially private data does not weaken its privacy guarantees [11]. Second, it
is robust to side information, meaning that learning additional information about data-producing entities does not
weaken differential privacy by much [12].
Originally, differentially privacy was designed to protect sensitive database entries each time a database is
queried [11]. Relative to encryption-based approaches, differential privacy is futureproof, in the sense that its privacy
guarantees do not depend upon certain calculations being infeasible for an adversary, in contrast to encryption
techniques that require updating encryption keys over time. Moreover, differential privacy can be significantly less
computationally demanding than some encryption approaches because it requires only generating random numbers.
Differential privacy has been applied in smart power grids previously [13], and the most relevant works in the
literature are [14–17]. Work in [14, 15] requires the presence of an external battery, which homes may not have.
Both [15] and [16] use the infinite divisibility of the Laplace distribution to have each agent add gamma-distributed
noise, leading to differential privacy for aggregated information but not for individuals; [15] addresses individual
privacy by incorporating homomorphic encryption, though this incurs significant computational expense as discussed
above. In contrast, this paper will provide differential privacy guarantees to all users without requiring any encryption.
The developments of [17] derive a tradeoff between individuals’ privacy and accuracy of state estimation. In this
paper, we derive tradeoffs as well, but from the perspective of the impact upon aggregate demand analysis and user
billing.
Given that privacy threats in smart power grids stem from aggregation over time, we will use a trajectory-level
notion of differential privacy [18, 19]. This different form of privacy provides different privacy guarantees from the
database form, and we will elaborate upon these differences in Section III. After implementing privacy, a natural
question is how privacy affects the functioning of the grid.
Aggregate power consumption is one very common piece of data of interest to utility companies, and privacy
should still allow for accurate aggregate analyses. In this work, we quantify the impact of privacy upon both
aggregate power analysis and billing. Although we will implement differential privacy by adding Laplacian noise,
we show that these analyses of private data can be done as though the noise added were Gaussian, thereby unlocking
tools for analysis from the theory of Gaussian stochastic processes. We then characterize the worst-case error for
both total power consumption at the network level and billing on the per-customer level. The contributions of this
paper are therefore the privacy implementation itself, together with statistical bounds on the error it induces in
aggregate analytics and customer billing.
Work in [20] develops a general-purpose method for paying bills in a differentially private manner (i.e., a billing
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3Fig. 1. In this work, all privacy noise is added at customers’ homes before any data is shared with the utility. Under a mandate of strong user
privacy – even from the utility itself – we explore the impact of differential privacy upon aggregate load computations and customer billing.
method not dedicated to smart grids), though our work takes a different approach: under a mandate of grid customer
privacy, we quantify the impact of that privacy upon billing in the smart grid setting. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first work to analyze the impact of differential privacy upon billing in smart grids.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II states the problems to be solved in this paper. Then,
Section III provides the necessary background on differential privacy and our implementation of it, as well as
technical preliminaries needed in the subsequent analysis. Next, Section IV bounds the effects of privacy upon
aggregate analysis and user billing, and Section V provides simulation results to demonstrate these developments
on real smart grid data. Finally, Section VI provides concluding remarks and directions for future research.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
In this section we outline the problems that are the focus of the remainder of the paper.
A. Problem Background and Setup
While smart meters produce several types of data that can be privatized, in this paper we focus on privatizing
signals of demand data. Time is measured by a discrete counter, k, which represents sampling continuous-time
demand signals with a sampling period ∆t. In this paper we consider time indices k ∈ K := {1, . . . ,K} for some
K ∈ N. The total number of customers in the region under study is denoted by N ∈ N. Define dik as the power
demand (in kW) of the ith customer at time instant k, for i ∈ [N ] := {1, . . . , N}.
As noted above, we will protect the power demand data of individual customers using differential privacy, and
that will require noise to be added to customers’ demand signals. The private demand of customer i at time k is
denoted by
dˆik := d
i
k + w
i
k, (1)
where wik is the noise added to provide differential privacy to customer i. The precise distribution of noise will
be developed below in Section III, and here we only introduce the terminology required to state the problems we
solve.
We consider a privacy architecture in which noise is added to the data in the smart meter itself. The raw data
never leaves the consumer’s premises, as shown in Figure 1. The private data set {dˆik}i∈[N ],k∈K is available to the
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4utility, which it can release to an in-house or third-party vendor for performing data analytics. This architecture
provides strong privacy guarantees to customers because not even the utility company has access to customers’
raw power demand data. Motivation for considering this scenario comes from the possibility of mandated privacy
rules on smart meter data in the future, much like the European Union’s recent General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR)1 for personal data. Motivation also comes from preventing privacy breaches of sensitive customer data,
and, by not sharing raw sensitive data at all, this architecture precludes such breaches. For the customer, a potential
cost for such strong privacy is uncertainty in billing. By only sharing privatized demand data, bills must be assessed
using noisy data. In fact any data analytics performed with private data will have some amount of error due to
privacy noise. We will explore the impact of privacy upon analytics and billing below.
B. Problem Statements
We focus on two use cases in particular: (i) energy use of a single customer and associated billing considerations,
and (ii) aggregate demand of a collection of consumers.
a) Billing/Energy Use: The main variable in the energy bill a customer receives at the end of a billing period
is the total energy used in that period2. Let the energy consumed by customer i in the k-th sampling interval be
Eik. Let the total energy consumed by customer i in an interval K = {0, 1, . . . ,K} be EiK :=
∑K
k=1E
i
k. Assuming
∆t is small enough, Eik = d
i
k∆t, and thus E
i
K =
∑
k∈K(d
i
k∆t). However, the utility does not have access to this
value exactly. Since only private energy data is available to the utility, it instead must bill its customers based on
an estimate of the energy computed from the private energy use data. The minimum variance estimator of the total
energy consumption of customer i over the interval K, which we call private energy consumption during K, is
EˆiK :=
∑K
k=1 dˆ
i
k∆t =
∑
k∈K(d
i
k + w
i
k)∆t. The estimation error is
E˜iK := Eˆ
i
K − EiK = ∆t
∑
k∈K
wik.
A statistical characterization of the error E˜iK as a function of privacy parameters is desired in order to understand
privacy’s impact upon billing, and that constitutes the first problem we will solve.
b) Error in the aggregate demand estimate: The aggregate demand dk of a collection of consumers is the
sum of demands of individual households at time k: dk :=
∑N
i=1 d
i
k. The private aggregate demand dˆk is the
utility’s estimate obtained by using the private data: dˆk :=
∑N
i=1 dˆ
i
k =
∑N
i=1(d
i
k + w
i
k). The error in this estimate
is therefore
d˜k := dˆk − dk =
∑
i∈[N ]
wik =: wk, (2)
which follows from Equation (II-A). The second problem is to statistically characterize this error and understand
its impact upon the utility’s analytics as a function of customers’ privacy parameters.
1https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/justice-and-fundamental-rights/data-protection/2018-reform-eu-data-protection-rules en
2For industrial customers there are other important variables such as peak demand, but we limit to residential customers here.
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5III. PRIVACY IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we briefly provide the necessary background on trajectory-level differential privacy, for which a
complete exposition can be found in [18]. Then we describe our privacy implementations for dik. We emphasize
that our developments are not on the theory of differential privacy itself, but, instead, are on the application of
differential privacy to smart meter data.
A. Differential Privacy Background
This subsection provides the requisite differential privacy background. We retain the notation typically used in
the literature and denote an arbitrary input by u in this subsection. These tools will be applied to dik specifically
below.
We first define the space ˜`p that will contain users’ sensitive input signals. User i’s input is ui := {uik}k∈K. The
truncation operator PT : ˜`p → `p is defined as
PT [u
i] =
u
i
k k ≤ T
0 k > T
.
Then we define ˜`p := {ui | PT [ui] ∈ `p for all T ∈ N}, and we have ui ∈ ˜`p. In particular, `p ( ˜`p, and the space
˜`
p includes, for example, signals that do not vanish asymptotically.
For all i ∈ [N ], user i contributes the input signal ui ∈ ˜`p to some system. The goal of differential privacy is
to make “nearby” input signals produce outputs with similar probability distributions. The notion of “nearby” is
formalized through an adjacency relation, which we define next.
Definition 1. Fix an adjacency parameter b > 0. For two inputs ui1, ui2 ∈ ˜`p, we define the binary symmetric
adjacency relation Adjb : ˜`p × ˜`p → {0, 1} via
Adjb(u
i
1, u
i
2) =
1 ‖u
i
1 − ui2‖`p ≤ b
0 otherwise
.
Differential privacy masks the differences between adjacent inputs. For example, in a smart grid, two demand
signals may differ if a home’s occupants return from work at a different time, or if they are on vacation for some
period of time before resuming normal power usage. The parameter b can then be chosen based on the size of
difference that should be masked, and larger values of b give greater privacy guarantees because more trajectories
must be made approximately indistinguishable. We note that this choice of adjacency pertains to single customers,
which differs from adjacency relations used for trajectories in [18, 21].
Differential privacy concerns the probability distributions of outputs that correspond to adjacent inputs. To state
its definition, we define a σ-algebra Σp over ˜`p, and details for cosntructing Σp are in [18]. Differential privacy itself
is enforced by a mechanism. Fixing a probability space (Ω,B,P), we formally state the definition of a differentially
private mechanism below.
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6Definition 2. A mechanism M : ˜`p×Ω→ ˜`q preserves -differential privacy if, for all adjacent inputs ui1, ui2 ∈ ˜`p,
P[M(ui1) ∈ S] ≤ eP[M(ui2) ∈ S] for all S ∈ Σp.
This definition encodes the fact that any eavesdropper or adversary is unlikely to learn anything meaningful about
sensitive data by looking at differentially private information. The likelihood of such privacy breaches is controlled
by the privacy parameter , which is user-specified. Typical values of  in the literature range from 0.1 to ln 3 [18],
with smaller values providing stronger privacy guarantees. One of the most widely used mechanisms for enforcing
Definition 4 is the Laplace mechanism, which adds Laplace noise to sensitive data. To define it, we first define the
sensitivity of a system. Regarding a causal, discrete-time, deterministic dynamical system as a map Gi : ˜`p → ˜`q ,
we have the following definition.
Definition 3. Let ui1, ui2 ∈ ˜`p be adjacent inputs to a system Gi. Then the `p-sensitivity of Gi is
∆pGi := sup
ui1,u
i
2∈˜`p
Adjb(u
i
1,u
i
2)=1
‖Gi(ui1)− Gi(ui2)‖`p .
It is in terms of the `1-sensitivity that we will define the Laplace mechanism. First, we introduce the notation
Lap(c) to denote a Laplace distribution with mean zero and scale parameter c, i.e.,
Lap(c) := f(0, c;x) =
1
2c
exp
(
−|x|
c
)
.
Definition 4. Let Gi : ˜`p → ˜`q be a causal, discrete-time, deterministic dynamical system with `1-sensitivity ∆1Gi.
Then the Laplace mechanism Mi(ui) := Gi(ui) + vi is -differentially private if vik ∼ Lap(c) with c ≥ ∆1Gi/.
We emphasize that privacy here is enforced at the trajectory level and customer i’s mechanism Mi provides a
single ˜`p-valued query that is shared pointwise in time. Unlike other works, these trajectory-level privacy guarantees
do not weaken over time because the output at each point in time is not a query of the initial state. Instead, the
private output at each point in time merely contributes to assembling a single trajectory-valued query.
B. Privatizing Customers’ Demand Data
We consider customers’ power demand trajectories over time to be the sensitive inputs that need to be protected.
Thus, while above we have used the symbol u to represent a sensitive input as in the private control literature, we
turn now to protecting the trajectories {dik}k∈K for each i ∈ [N ]; [18, Lemma 2] guarantees that privacy at the
trajectory level also provides privacy to all finite truncations of trajectories, and thus the above definitions apply
regardless of the value of K.
We regard customer i’s demand signal di as passing through a memoryless “identity system” whose output is
equal to its input. Formally, I(dik) = dik, for all k ∈ K and i ∈ [N ]. We use the adjacency relation Adjb for
each system of this kind, and implementing privacy for it then requires a sensitivity bound. This bound takes an
elementary form in the following lemma.
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7Lemma 1. The identity system I(dik) = dik has `p-sensitivity bounded by b, i.e., ∆pI ≤ b.
Proof: For adjacent ui1 and u
i
2, ‖I
(
ui1
)− I(ui2)‖`p = ‖ui1 − ui2‖`p ≤ b, which follows from adjacency. 
The basic form of the sensitivity bound above also gives a simple differential privacy implementation.
Theorem 1. Let  > 0 and b > 0 be given. The following Laplace mechanism provides -differential privacy to the
i-th customer: Mi(di) = di + wi, wik ∼ Lap
(
0, b/).
Proof: Follows from Definitions 3 and 4 and Lemma 1. 
It is understood above that the privacy noise terms added to each customer’s data are mutually independent.
Since demand data is privatized at each customer’s site, the utility has access to only the private data. Any analytics
are performed not upon agent i’s raw demand value dik, but instead upon the private demand dˆ
i
k. The privacy
noise impacts the accuracy of analytics performed with this data, and quantifying these impacts is the subject
of Section IV. Before doing so, we derive several results we will need in our accuracy analyses.
C. Technical Preliminaries for Stochastic Processes
As both aggregate demand of a neighborhood and energy use of a single customer involve summing over noisy
samples, sums of random variables will appear in the forthcoming analysis. In either case, as long as the sum is over
a large number of random variables, we can appeal to the central limit theorem to use a Gaussian approximation.
In case of private aggregate demand analysis, the sum will be over consumers while in case of energy use the sum
will be over time. The number of summands in either case is finite, and in some cases may be small. To justify a
Gaussian analysis, we now introduce a theoretical tool, the Berry-Esseen theorem, which provides a convergence
rate for the central limit theorem as a function of the number of summands.
Lemma 2. (Berry-Esseen Theorem [22, Chapter XVI]) Let {X`}`∈L⊆N be a collection of m i.i.d. random variables,
with zero mean, variance σ2, and third moment ρ <∞. Let
Z(m) =
X1 + · · ·+Xm
σ
√
m
have CDF FZ(m) and let Φ(x) be the CDF of a standard normal random variable (zero mean, unit variance). Then
sup
x∈R
∣∣FZ(m)(x)− Φ(x)∣∣ ≤ C ρ
σ3
√
m
,
where C is a universal constant.
Over time, various estimates have been made for C, and recent work has bounded it above by 0.4748 for this
setting [23]. For simplicity, we will proceed with C = 12 .
In the problems we consider, each X` is a Laplacian random variable with mean 0 and scale parameter c.
Specializing to this case, we have the following result.
Lemma 3. Let η > 0 be arbitrary. The distribution of the sum of m i.i.d. Laplacian random variables, each
with distribution Lap(c), is approximately Gaussian with variance 2mc2, with error less than η (in the sense of
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8Lemma 2) if
m ≥ 9
64η2c6
.
Proof: Straightforward calculations show that the Laplace distribution Lap(c) has variance 2c2 and third moment
6c3. With C = 12 , using these values in Lemma 2 and bounding the error above by η gives
1
2
6c3
8c6
√
m
≤ η. Solving
for m completes the proof. 
Below we use the term “η-approximately Gaussian” to describe any distribution with error not more than η in
the sense of Lemma 2. As a concrete example, for b = 2,  = 1, Lemma 3 tells us that we need m ≥ 22 for the
sum of m Laplace random variables to be 0.01-approximately Gaussian. We will later use this bound to show that
Gaussian analyses are possible under reasonable assumptions.
Lemma 4. Let g1, . . . , gn be i.i.d. Gaussian, each with 0 mean and variance σ20 . For n ≥ 43,
0.338σ0
√
log n ≤ E
[
max
1≤i≤n
gi
]
≤
√
2σ0
√
log n.
The variance of the max, for any n, is upper bounded by
var
[
max
1≤i≤n
gi
]
≤ 4σ20 .
Although the maximum of Gaussian random variables is widely studied, bounds on the mean available in the
literature frequently contain unknown constants, e.g., [24, Appendix A]. The lower bound on the mean provided in
the Lemma, which we prove below, represents a slight tightening of the best available bound we have found [25].
This bound will be applied below to bound the maximum error over samples in time and the maximum error over
customers. Requiring n ≥ 43 is a very mild assumption because it merely requires having at least 43 customers
in a power grid or at least 43 samples in a dataset, and both of these conditions are easily satisfied in the vast
majority of cases. The bound on the variance is derived from standard concentration inequalities on the maximum
of Gaussians, and is likely to be already known, but we were unable to find a reference and thus include the proof
here.
Proof of Lemma 4. The mean upper bound can be found in [24, Appendix A], so we prove only a lower bound
for the mean. Let S1 be the event “there exists an i such that gi ≥ σ0
√
log n”, and let S2 be the complementary
event “gi < σ0
√
log n for all i”. For economy of notation we define the symbol gmax = max1≤i≤n gi. Then
E [gmax] = E [gmax | S1] P[S1] + E [gmax | S2] P[S2]. (3)
We lower-bound the right-hand side by noting that
E [gmax | S2] ≥ E [gi | S2] ≥ E[gi | gi < 0] = −σ0
√
2/pi,
which uses the expectation of the half-normal distribution [26, Equation (3)].
Using the complementarity of S1 and S2, we return to Equation (III-C) to find
E [gmax] ≥ E [gmax | S1] P[S1]− σ0
√
2/pi
(
1− P[S1]
)
.
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9Certainly E [gmax | S1] ≥ σ0
√
log n, which gives
E [gmax] ≥
(
σ0
√
log n
)
P[S1]− σ0
√
2/pi
(
1− P[S1]
)
, (4)
and all that remains is to estimate P[S1]. By definition,
P[S1] = P
[
∃ i | gi ≥ σ0
√
log n
]
= 1− P
[
gi < σ0
√
log n
]n
= 1−
(
1− P [gi ≥ σ0√log n])n. (5)
Using the relationship Φ(x) = 12
(
1 + erf
(
x√
2
))
, we have
P
[
gi ≥ σ0
√
log n
]
=1− Φ(
√
log n) =
1
2
(
1−erf
(√
log n√
2
))
.
Next, using erf(x) ≤
√
1− exp (− 4pix2) [25] we have
P
[
gi ≥ σ0
√
log n
] ≥ 1
2
(
1−
√
1− exp
(
− 2
pi
log n
))
. (6)
A simple calculation shows that
1
2
(
1−
√
1− exp
(
− 2
pi
log n
))
≥ 1
n
(7)
if lognlog(4n−4) ≥ pi2pi−2 , and the first such n is n = 43.
Using Equations (III-C) and (III-C) in Equation (III-C), we then find
P
[
S1
] ≥ 1− (1− 1
n
)n
.
The right-hand side is decreasing in n, and we take the limit as n → ∞ to derive a bound that holds for all n,
giving P
[
S1
] ≥ 1− e−1. Using this value in Equation (III-C) gives
E[gmax] ≥
(
0.632− 0.368
√
2/pi
)
σ0
√
log n,
and the mean bound follows from a numerical calculation.
The variance bound is proved from the following concentration inequality: defining g = gmax−E [gmax], we have
P(|g| > t) ≤ 2 exp
(
− t2
2σ20
)
for t ≥ 0 [24, pg. 141]. Define Z = g2, so we have P(Z > t) ≤ 2 exp(− t
2σ20
) and
var(X) = E[Z]. Since Z is a non-negative r.v.,
E[Z] =
∫
R+
P(Z ≥ z)dz ≤
∫ ∞
0
2 exp(− z
2σ2o
)dz
= −4σ20
[
exp
(
− z
2σ20
)] ∣∣∣∣∞
0
= 4σ20 .

We next apply these results to bound privacy-induced errors in smart grid calculations.
IV. ANALYSIS OF DATA ANALYTICS ACCURACY
This section analyzes the impact of differential privacy first upon customers’ billing and then upon a utility’s
data-driven analytics that are informed by private data.
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A. Energy Use/Billing
Recall from Section II-B that, when using private data, the error in the estimated energy consumption over a
period K = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,K} for customer i is
E˜iK = ∆t
∑
k∈K
wik.
a) An arbitrary customer: We begin our billing analysis by analyzing the impact upon any single customer.
The mean error in energy consumption is E[E˜iK] = 0, and this holds irrespective of design choices. The variance is
var[E˜iK] = K[∆t]
2var[wik] = 2K
b2
2 [∆t]
2, which follows from the fact that privacy noise has variance 2c2 = 2 b
2
2 .
Since K and ∆t are interrelated, consider a (continuous time) interval τ over which energy use is to be estimated.
Since the corresponding number of samples is K = τ∆t , we have
var
[
E˜iK
]
= 2τ∆t
b2
2
. (8)
The trade-off between privacy and accuracy is apparent from this dependency on b and : a larger b and smaller
 provide stronger privacy (see Section III), while Equation (IV-A.0.a) shows that such a choice leads to higher
uncertainty in the energy use estimate, with variance growing quadratically in b and inverse quadratically with .
A related point is the effect of sampling frequency. Since billing is typically done monthly, we can consider τ
to be a fixed constant and not a design variable. Eq. (IV-A.0.a) shows that the uncertainty in the monthly energy
use estimate introduced by the privacy noise can be reduced by using a smaller ∆t, i.e., by sampling the demand
more frequently3.
Cost of privacy: Let us now consider some numerical values to see how this analysis can drive design of privacy
mechanisms. Suppose  = 1 and τ = 30× 24 hours (representing one month). For ∆t = 14 (15-minute sampling),
the variance in the monthly energy use is 360b2 while for ∆t = 160 (1-minute sampling), the variance reduces to
24b2, in (kWh)2. For b = 2, an arguably small value (as we will see in Section V), the corresponding standard
deviations are 37.9 and 9.8 kWh for 15-minute and 1-minute sampling, respectively. The average monthly energy
use of residential homes in the USA in 2015 was 1883 kWh4, so a standard deviation of 10 kWh might be tolerable
for a consumer, though 38 kWh might not be.
b) The worst-affected customer: Due to the error in the monthly energy use estimate due to privacy noise, a
consumer’s monthly bill may also be erroneous. Although these errors are 0 on average, even a single instance of a
large error may cause large annoyance, and, in certain cases, even financial hardship to the customer. The customer
that has the largest error will be the one who is most severely affected. The worst error among a set of customers is
a crucial value since it may very well dictate consumer acceptance of the technology by driving public debate. We
examine this maximum error next. The maximum error is itself a random variable, so its first and second moments
are analyzed.
3Although this may appear counterintuitive since the number of random variables being summed increases linearly as 1/∆t, notice that the
variance of each summand is quadratic in ∆t, which leads to the reduction in the variance as ∆t is reduced.
4https://www.eia.gov/consumption/residential/data/2015/c&e/pdf/ce1.1.pdf
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Specializing the discussion following Lemma 3 to the sum that makes up E˜iK , we see that for  = 1 and b = 2,
we need K ≥ 22 for E˜iK to be 0.01-approximately Gaussian. Even with 15-minute sampling, for a month-long
period, K = 2880 22, justifying Gaussian analysis of E˜iK .
Theorem 2. Assuming the Gaussian approximation of E˜iK holds, the mean of the maximum of E˜iK among N
consumers is bounded according to
0.478
b

∆t
√
K
√
logN ≤ E
[
max
1≤i≤N
E˜iK
]
≤ 2b

∆t
√
K
√
logN.
The variance of the maximum of E˜iK is upper-bounded by
var
[
max
1≤i≤N
E˜i
]
≤ 8Kb
2
2
[∆t]2.
Proof of Theorem 2. As shown previously (right before (IV-A.0.a)), E˜iK has mean 0 and variance 2K
b2
2 [∆t]
2. The
expectation bound then follows from Lemma 4 with σ20 = 2Kb
2/2[∆t]2. The variance bound follows from the
second part of Lemma 4. 
Theorem 2 allows one to estimate the cost of privacy for customers without going through an expensive data
collection process. The bounds only depend on statistics of privacy noise, data sampling rate, and number of
customers. We will return to this point in Section V.
B. Aggregate demand
Recall that d˜k = wk =
∑
i∈[N ] w
i
k (cf. (II-B.0.b)) is the error in the aggregate demand of a collection of N
consumers estimated from their private demand data at time k. By appealing to the Berry-Esseen Theorem (Lemma
2), we can model wk as Gaussian, as long as N is large enough. Again specializing the discussion following Lemma
3 to the sum that makes up d˜k, we see that for  = 1 and b = 2, we need N ≥ 22 for d˜k to be 0.01-approximately
Gaussian, for any k. For any utility, the number of customers is far higher than 22, thus justifying a Gaussian
approximation.
The mean of d˜k is 0 and its variance is σ2wk = 2N
b2
2 , which follows from the fact that w
i
k ∼ Lap(c), c = b , and
the variance of a Laplace random variable with scale parameter c is 2c2. Therefore, E[d˜k] = 0 and var[d˜k] = 2N b
2
2 .
Thus, though the average error is 0, the uncertainty in the error grows linearly with the number of consumers over
which aggregation is performed.
Theorem 3. Assume N is large enough that d˜k is approximately Gaussian for all k. Then
0.478
√
N
b

√
logK ≤ E
[
max
1≤k≤K
d˜k
]
≤ 2b

√
N
√
logK.
The variance of the max, for any K ∈ N, is bounded via
var
[
max
1≤k≤K
d˜k
]
≤ 8N b
2
2
.
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Proof of Theorem 3. Since d˜k = wk, which is a sum of N Laplacian random variables, Lemma 4 shows that N ≥ 22
is sufficient to be 0.01-approximately Gaussian. wk has mean zero and variance 2Nb2/2 and the expectation bound
follows from Lemma 4 with σ20 = 2Nb
2/2; the variance bound likewise follows from Lemma 4. 
This result shows that on average, the maximum error grows with the square root of the length of time horizon,
with variance independent of time. The former is bad news while the latter is good news: peak demand computed
over long time horizons may become progressively poorer when it is dominated by the maximum error. The result
also reveals the trade-off between privacy and accuracy: larger b will lead to a larger maximum error, as will smaller
values of .
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we use high-resolution demand and energy data from a number of residences to illustrate the trade-
offs discussed in the previous sections. The data is taken from the Pecan Street Project (from https://dataport.cloud);
see [27] for details about the dataset.
a) Choosing privacy parameters: For numerical investigations reported here, we choose  = log 2, which is
within typical ranges for differential privacy implementations [18]. The value of b requires more care since it deter-
mines what trajectories will be rendered approximately indistinguishable with the resulting privacy implementation.
Choosing an appropriate b depends on the nature of the data and which events are to be masked [18]. We use b = 1
for the numerical investigations to follow. This choice creates a significant difference between the true trajectory
and the private one. Figure 2 shows the true demand and its private version created with b = 1 for an arbitrarily
chosen home.We can see from the figure that the privacy noise is larger than even the maximum daily demand in
many instants.
b) Maximum error in monthly energy use: Figure 3 shows the numerically estimated mean and variance of
the maximum monthly energy use error among N consumers as a function of N , for the month of August 2017.
Since the demand data is sampled every 5 minutes, K = 31 × 24 × 12 = 8928. For each value of N shown,
we generate samples of the random variable Z(N)max := max1≤i≤N E˜iK via random sampling with replacement, as
follows. Among the 300 total homes we have data for, N homes (N < 300) are randomly chosen, the error in their
energy use estimate over the month is computed (by using true demand and private demand), and the max value is
computed among the N samples. By performing this experiment repeatedly, each time choosing a random subset
of size N from the total available 300, we obtain samples of the random variable Z(N)max. The mean and variance of
Z
(N)
max are then estimated from these samples. Figure 3 also shows the upper and lower bounds on the mean, and
the upper bound on the standard deviation, predicted by Theorem 2. We see the bounds on the mean are tighter
than the bound on the variance.
Cost of privacy (again): As in the single/arbitrary customer case, the maximum error in monthly energy use
estimate due to privacy can be used to compute a worst-case cost of privacy. In this instance, for a utility with a
customer base of 250 households, the average cost of privacy to the worst-hit customer is 43.8kWh/month, which
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Fig. 2. Demand and private demand over 24 hours from an arbitrarily chosen home from the Pecan Street Dataset, with b = 1. The masking
effects of privacy noise can be seen here in deviations of the private curve from the true one.
translates to $5.6/month at the current average rate of 12.9¢/kWh5. If one uses “mean plus 3-sigma” to estimate
the cost, then it turns out to be 43.8 + 15 = 58.8 kWh/month, or $7.6/month. For a larger customer base, these
numbers will increase, but since the growth of the mean is logarithmic and the variance is constant, the increase
will be small. These bounds allow us to compute the same worst-case cost of privacy but without having to go
through an expensive data collection process on customer demand. Repeating the calculation done in the previous
paragraph, but using the theoretical upper bounds obtained in Theorem 2, we find an upper bound on the cost of
privacy for the worst-hit customer to be $19/month.
c) Maximum error in aggregate demand: Figure 4 shows the trajectory of the aggregate demand from all 300
homes in the dataset, as well as the private aggregate demand (computed by using the private demand data), for a
period of 4 days. Figure 5 shows mean and standard deviation bounds on the maximum error in the private data
over time. Both plots indicate that privacy incurs only modest errors with respect to power usage data.
5From https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/, second tab.
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Fig. 3. Numerically estimated mean and standard deviation of the maximum monthly energy use estimation error as a function of number of
customers, computed from 100,000 samples for each N . The upper and lower mean bounds from Theorem 2 are shown in dashed lines, and the
upper bound for the standard deviation is shown as a dashdot line. Theorem 2 suggests privacy induces only modest error and these numerical
results confirm that this is the case.
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Fig. 4. Aggregate demand and private aggregate demand from 300 homes in the Pecan Street Project dataset over 4 days. Here we see only
modest error in the private aggregate demand signal, indicating that accurate data can be gathered even under a mandate of privacy.
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Fig. 5. Numerically estimated mean and standard deviation of the maximum monthly energy use estimation error as a function of times,
computed from data for 300 homes. The upper and lower mean bounds from Theorem 3 are shown in dashed lines, and the upper bound for
the standard deviation is shown as a dashdot line. Theorem 3 suggests privacy induces only modest error and these numerical results confirm
that this is the case.
VI. CONCLUSION
We applied trajectory-level differential privacy to demand data from customer smart meters. Because data is made
private at the customer’s home, any analysis with that data has uncertainty. This includes computing monthly energy
use, which is essential for billing. We analyzed the average and worst case errors, and showed that the trade-off
between privacy guarantees and analysis accuracy can be translated to a financial cost of privacy to the consumer.
In this preliminary work, we limited our analysis to energy use for a consumer and aggregate demand among
all consumers. The peak demand of the aggregate is a valuable quantity for grid planning, and how privacy noise
affects the estimate of peak demand remains to be investigated.
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